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Abstract
The paper proposes a bimodal logic that describes an inter-
play between distributed knowledge modality and coalition
know-how modality. Unlike other similar systems, the one
proposed here assumes perfect recall by all agents. Perfect
recall is captured in the system by a single axiom. The main
technical results are the soundness and the completeness the-
orems for the proposed logical system.
Introduction
Autonomous agents such as self-driving cars and robotic
vacuum cleaners are facing the challenge of navigating with-
out having complete information about the current situation.
Such a setting could be formally captured by an epistemic
transition system where an agent uses instructions to transi-
tion the system between states without being able to distin-
guish some of these states. In this paper we study properties
of strategies in such systems. An example of such a system
is the epistemic transition system T1, depicted in Figure 1.
It has six states named w0, w′0, w1, w
′
1, w2, w
′
2 and two in-
structions 0 and 1 that an agent a can use to transition the
system from one state to another. For instance, if an instruc-
tion 0 is given in state w0, then the system transitions into
state w1. The system is called epistemic because the agent
cannot distinguish statewi from statew′i for each i = 0, 1, 2.
The indistinguishability relation is shown in the figure using
dashed lines. Atomic proposition p is true only in state w2.
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Figure 1: Epistemic Transition System T1.
The logical system that we propose consists of two modal-
ities. The first is the knowledge modality K. Imagine that
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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the system starts in state w2. Since agent a cannot distin-
guish state w2 from state w′2 where statement p is not sat-
isfied, the agent does not know if p is true or not. We write
this as (w2) 1 Kap. Next, suppose that the system started
in state w1 and the agent used instruction 0 to transition
the system into state w2. In this paper we assume that all
agents have perfect recall, so in state w2 the agent remem-
bers history (w1, 0, w2). However, such a history is indis-
tinguishable from history (w′1, 0, w
′
2) because the agent can-
not distinguish state w1 from state w′1 and state w2 from
state w′2. Thus, the agent does not know that proposition
p is true in the state w2 even with history (w1, 0, w2). We
denote this by (w1, 0, w2) 1 Kap. Finally, assume that the
system started in state w0 and the agent first used instruc-
tion 1 to transition it into state w1 and later instruction 0
to transition it to state w2. Thus, the history of the system
is (w0, 1, w1, 0, w2). The only history that the agent cannot
distinguish from this one is history (w′0, 1, w1, 0, w2). Since
both of these histories end in a state where proposition p
is satisfied, agent a does know that proposition p is true in
state w2, given history (w0, 1, w1, 0, w2). We write this as
(w0, 1, w1, 0, w2)  Kap.
The other modality that we consider is the strategic power.
In system T1, the agent can transition the system from state
w1 to state w2 by using instruction 0. Similarly, the agent
can transition the system from state w′1 to state w2 by using
instruction 1. In other words, given either history (w1) or
history (w′1) the agent can transition the system to a state in
which atomic proposition p is satisfied. We say that, given
either history, agent a has a strategy to achieve p. Histo-
ries (w1) and (w′1) are the only histories indistinguishable
by agent a from history (w1). Since she has a strategy to
achieve p under all histories indistinguishable from history
(w1), we say that given history (w1) the agent knows that
she has a strategy. Similarly, given history (w′1), she also
knows that she has a strategy. However, since indistinguish-
able histories (w1) and (w′1) require different strategies to
achieve p, given history (w1) she does not know what the
strategy is. We say that she does not have a know-how strat-
egy. We denote this by (w1) 1 Hap, where H stands for
know-How. Of course, it is also true that (w′1) 1 Hap.
The situation changes if the transition system starts in
state w0 instead of state w1 and transitions to state w1 under
instruction 1. Now the history is (w0, 1, w1) and the histo-
ries that the agent cannot distinguish from this one are his-
tory (w′0, 1, w1) and history (w0, 1, w1) itself. Given both of
these two histories, agent a can achieve p using the same
transition 0. Thus, (w0, 1, w1)  Hap.
Finally note that there are only two histories: (w0) and
(w′0) indistinguishable from (w0). Given either history,
agent a can achieve Hap using instruction 1. Thus, (w0) 
HaHap. That is, given history (w0) agent a knows how to
transition to a state in which formula Hap is satisfied.
Multiagent Systems Like many other autonomous agents,
self-driving cars are expected to use vehicle-to-vehicle com-
munication to share traffic information and to coordinate ac-
tions (Harding et al. 2014). Thus, it is natural to consider
epistemic transition systems that have more than one agent.
An example of such a system T2 is depicted in Figure 2. This
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Figure 2: Epistemic Transition System T2.
system has five epistemic states: w0, w1, w2, w3, and w4 and
three agents: a, b, and c. In each state the agents vote either
0 or 1 and the system transitions into the next state based
on the majority vote. For example, since the directed edge
from state w0 to state w4 is labelled with 1, if the majority
of agents in state w0 votes 1, then the system transitions into
state w4. Since coalition {a, b} forms a majority, this coali-
tion has a strategy to transition the system from state w0 to
state w4 and, thus, to achieve p. Note that agent a cannot
distinguish state w0 from state w1 and thus agent a does not
know what she should vote for to achieve p. Similarly, agent
b also does not know what she should vote for to achieve
p because she cannot distinguish state w0 from state w2. In
this paper, we assume that members of a coalition make the
decisions based on combined (distributed) knowledge of the
whole coalition. In our example, coalition {a, b} can distin-
guish state w0 from both state w1 and state w2. Thus, given
history (w0) the coalition {a, b} knows how to achieve p. We
denote this by (w0)  H{a,b}p, or simply as (w0)  Ha,bp.
Universal Principles We have discussed a statement be-
ing true or false given a certain history. This paper focuses
on the logical principles that are true for each history in each
epistemic transition system. An example of such a princi-
ple is the strategic positive introspection: HCϕ→ KCHCϕ.
This principle says that if a coalition knows how to achieve
ϕ, then the coalition knows that it knows how to achieve ϕ.
Informally, this principle is true because in order for state-
ment HCϕ to be satisfied for a given history h, coalition
C must have a strategy to achieve ϕ that works under any
history h′ indistinguishable from history h by the coalition.
Thus, the same strategy must work for any history h′′ in-
distinguishable from history h′ by the coalition. In other
words, it is also true that h′  HCϕ. Recall that h′ is an
arbitrary history indistinguishable from history h by coali-
tion C. Hence, h  KCHCϕ according to the standard se-
mantics of the epistemic modality KC . A similar argument
can be used to justify the strategic negative introspection:
¬HCϕ→ KC¬HCϕ.
Another universal principle is the empty coalition princi-
ple: K∅ϕ → H∅ϕ. Indeed, K∅ϕ means that statement ϕ is
true under any history indistinguishable from the given his-
tory by an empty coalition. Since an empty coalition cannot
distinguish any two histories, the assumption K∅ϕ means
that statement ϕ is true under any history. In particular, this
statement is true after the next transition no matter how
agents vote. Hence, H∅ϕ.
The epistemic modality KC also satisfies axioms of
epistemic logic S5 for distributed knowledge. Know-how
modality satisfies the unachievability of falsehood princi-
ple: ¬HC⊥, stating that no coalition can achieve ⊥. Know-
how modality also satisfies a form of cooperation princi-
ple (Pauly 2001; 2002):
HC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (HDϕ→ HC∪Dψ), where C ∩D = ∅.
Perfect Recall A complete trimodal logical system de-
scribing the interplay between distributed knowledge modal-
ity KC , coalition know-how modality HC , and standard (not
know-how) strategic power modality in the imperfect re-
call setting was proposed by (Naumov and Tao 2017c). We
provide a complete axiomatization of the interplay between
modalities KC and HC in the perfect recall setting. Surpris-
ingly, the assumption of perfect recall by all agents is cap-
tured by a single principle that we call the perfect recall
principle: HDϕ → HDKCϕ, where D ⊆ C 6= ∅. This
principle says that if a sub-coalition D ⊆ C can achieve ϕ,
then after the vote the whole coalition will know that ϕ is
true. Informally, this principle is true because coalition C is
able to recall how sub-coalition D voted and, thus, will de-
duce that formula ϕ is true after the transition. As an empty
coalition has no memory even in the perfect recall setting,
it is essential for coalition C to be nonempty. However, the
sub-coalition D can be empty.
Literature Review Non-epistemic logics of coalition
power were developed by (Pauly 2001; 2002), who also
proved the completeness of the basic logic of coalition
power. His approach has been widely studied in the liter-
ature (Goranko 2001; van der Hoek and Wooldridge 2005;
Borgo 2007; Sauro et al. 2006; A˚gotnes et al. 2010; A˚gotnes,
van der Hoek, and Wooldridge 2009; Belardinelli 2014;
Goranko, Jamroga, and Turrini 2013). An alternative logi-
cal system for coalition power was proposed by (More and
Naumov 2012).
(Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman 2002) introduced
Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL) that combines
temporal and coalition modalities. (van der Hoek and
Wooldridge 2003) proposed to combine ATL with epis-
temic modality to form Alternating-Time Temporal Epis-
temic Logic. They did not prove the completeness the-
orem for the proposed logical system. Aminof, Murano,
Rubin and Zuleger (Aminof et al. 2016) studied model-
checking problems of an extension of ATL with epistemic
and “prompt eventually” modal operators.
(A˚gotnes and Alechina 2012) proposed a complete logi-
cal system that combines the coalition power and epistemic
modalities. Since their system does not have epistemic re-
quirements on strategies, it does not contain any axioms de-
scribing the interplay of these modalities. In the extended
version, (A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016) added a complete ax-
iomatization of an interplay between single-agent knowl-
edge and know-how modalities.
Know-how strategies were studied before under differ-
ent names. While (Jamroga and A˚gotnes 2007) talked about
“knowledge to identify and execute a strategy”, (Jamroga
and van der Hoek 2004) discussed “difference between an
agent knowing that he has a suitable strategy and know-
ing the strategy itself”. (van Benthem 2001) called such
strategies “uniform”. (Broersen 2008) investigated a re-
lated notion of “knowingly doing”, while (Broersen, Herzig,
and Troquard 2009) studied modality “know they can do”.
(Wang 2015; 2016) captured the “knowing how” as a binary
modality in a complete logical system with a single agent
and without the knowledge modality.
Coalition know-how strategies for enforcing a condition
indefinitely were investigated by (Naumov and Tao 2017a).
Such strategies are similar to (Pauly 2001, p. 80) “goal main-
tenance” strategies in “extended coalition logic”. A similar
complete logical system in a single-agent setting for know-
how strategies to achieve a goal in multiple steps rather than
to maintain a goal is developed by (Fervari et al. 2017).
(Naumov and Tao 2017c) also proposed a complete
trimodal logical system describing an interplay between
distributed knowledge modality KC , coalition know-how
modality HC , and standard (not know-how) strategic power
modality in the imperfect recall setting.
In this paper we provide a complete axiomatization of an
interplay between modalities KC and HC in the perfect re-
call setting. The main challenge in proving the complete-
ness, compared to (A˚gotnes and Alechina 2016; Fervari et
al. 2017; Naumov and Tao 2017c; 2017a), is the need to
construct not only “possible worlds”, but the entire “possible
histories”, see the proof of Lemma 15.
Outline First, we introduce the syntax and semantics of
our logical system. Next, we list the axioms and give exam-
ples of proofs in the system. Then, we prove the complete-
ness of this system. The proof of the soundness is available
in the full version of this paper (Naumov and Tao 2017b).
Syntax and Semantics
Throughout the rest of the paper we assume a fixed set of
agentsA. By XY we denote the set of all functions from set
Y to setX , or in other words, the set of all tuples of elements
from set X indexed by the elements of set Y . If t ∈ XY is
such a tuple and y ∈ Y , then by (t)y we denote the y-th
component of tuple t.
We now proceed to describe the formal syntax and seman-
tics of our logical system starting with the definition of a
transition system. Although our introductory examples used
voting to decide on the next state of the system, in this paper
we investigate universal properties of an arbitrary nondeter-
ministic action aggregation mechanism.
Definition 1 A tuple (W, {∼a}a∈A, V,M, pi) is called an
epistemic transition system, if
1. W is a set of epistemic states,
2. ∼a is an indistinguishability equivalence relation on W
for each a ∈ A,
3. V is a nonempty set called domain of choices,
4. M ⊆W × V A ×W is an aggregation mechanism,
5. pi is a function that maps propositional variables into sub-
sets of W .
For example, in the transition system T1 depicted in Fig-
ure 1, the set of states W is {w0, w1, w2, w′0, w′1, w′2} and
relation ∼a is a transitive reflexive closure of {(w0, w′0),
(w1, w
′
1), (w2, w
′
2)}.
Informally, an epistemic transition system is regular if
there is at least one next state for each outcome of the vote.
Definition 2 An epistemic transition system (W, {∼a}a∈A,
V,M, pi) is regular if for each w ∈ W and each s ∈ V A,
there is w′ ∈W such that (w, s, w′) ∈M .
A coalition is a subset ofA. A strategy profile of coalition
C is any tuple in the set V C .
Definition 3 For any states w1, w2 ∈ W and any coalition
C, let w1 ∼C w2 if w1 ∼a w2 for each agent a ∈ C.
Lemma 1 For each coalition C, relation ∼C is an equiva-
lence relation on the set of epistemic states W . 
Definition 4 For all strategy profiles s1 and s2 of coalitions
C1 and C2 respectively and any coalition C ⊆ C1 ∩ C2, let
s1 =C s2 if (s1)a = (s2)a for each a ∈ C.
Lemma 2 For any coalition C, relation =C is an equiva-
lence relation on the set of all strategy profiles of coalitions
containing coalition C. 
Definition 5 A history is an arbitrary sequence h =
(w0, s1, w1, s2, w2, . . . , sn, wn) such that n ≥ 0 and
1. wi ∈W for each i ≤ n,
2. si ∈ V A for each i ≤ n,
3. (wi, si+1, wi+1) ∈M for each i < n.
In this paper we assume that votes of all agents are private.
Thus, an individual agent only knows her own votes and the
equivalence classes of the states that the system has been
at. This is formally captured in the following definition of
indistinguishability of histories by an agent.
Definition 6 For any history h = (w0, s1, w1, . . . , sn, wn),
any history h′ = (w′0, s
′
1, w
′
1, . . . , s
′
m, w
′
m), and any agent
a ∈ A, let h ≈a h′ if n = m and
1. wi ∼a w′i for each i ≤ n,
2. (si)a = (s′i)a for each i ≤ n.
Definition 7 For any histories h1, h2 and any coalition C,
let h1 ≈C h2 if h1 ≈a h2 for each agent a ∈ C.
Lemma 3 For any coalition C, relation ≈C is an equiva-
lence relation on the set of histories. 
The length |h| of a history h = (w0, s1, w1, . . . , sn, wn) is
the value of n. By Definition 7, the empty coalition cannot
distinguish any two histories, even of different lengths.
Lemma 4 |h1| = |h2| for each histories h1 and h2 such
that h1 ≈C h2 for some nonempty coalition C. 
For any sequence x = x1, . . . , xn and an element y, by
sequence x :: y we mean x1, . . . , xn, y. If sequence x is
nonempty, then by hd(x) we mean element xn.
Lemma 5 If (h1 :: s1 :: w1) ≈C (h2 :: s2 :: w2), then
h1 ≈C h2, s1 =C s2, and w1 ∼C w2. 
Definition 8 Let Φ be the language specified as follows
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | KCϕ | HCϕ, where C ⊆ A.
Boolean constants ⊥ and > are defined as usual.
Definition 9 For any history h of an epistemic transition
system (W, {∼a}a∈A, V,M, pi) and any formula ϕ ∈ Φ, let
satisfiability relation h  ϕ be defined as follows
1. h  p if hd(h) ∈ pi(p) and p is a propositional variable,
2. h  ¬ϕ if h 1 ϕ,
3. h  ϕ→ ψ if h 1 ϕ or h  ψ,
4. h  KCϕ if h′  ϕ for each history h′ s.t. h ≈C h′,
5. h  HCϕ if there is a strategy profile s ∈ V C such that
for any history h′ :: s′ :: w′, if h ≈C h′ and s =C s′, then
h′ :: s′ :: w′  ϕ.
Axioms
In additional to propositional tautologies in language Φ, our
logical system consists of the following axioms:
1. Truth: KCϕ→ ϕ,
2. Negative Introspection: ¬KCϕ→ KC¬KCϕ,
3. Distributivity: KC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (KCϕ→ KCψ),
4. Monotonicity: KCϕ→ KDϕ, if C ⊆ D,
5. Strategic Positive Introspection: HCϕ→ KCHCϕ,
6. Cooperation: HC(ϕ → ψ) → (HDϕ → HC∪Dψ), where
C ∩D = ∅,
7. Empty Coalition: K∅ϕ→ H∅ϕ,
8. Perfect Recall: HDϕ→ HDKCϕ, where D ⊆ C 6= ∅,
9. Unachievability of Falsehood: ¬HC⊥.
We write ` ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the axioms of
our logical system using Necessitation, Strategic Necessita-
tion, and Modus Ponens inference rules:
ϕ
KCϕ
ϕ
HCϕ
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
.
We write X ` ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the theorems
of our logical system and a set of additional axiomsX using
only Modus Ponens inference rule.
The next lemma follows from a well-known observation
that the Positive Introspection axiom is provable from the
other axioms of S5. The proof can be found in the full ver-
sion of this paper (Naumov and Tao 2017b).
Lemma 6 ` KCϕ→ KCKCϕ. 
The proof of the following soundness theorem is also
given in (Naumov and Tao 2017b).
Theorem 1 If ` ϕ, then h  ϕ for each history of each
regular epistemic transition system.
Derivation Examples
This section contains examples of formal proofs in our log-
ical system. The results obtained here are used in the proof
of completeness. The proof of Lemma 7 is based on the one
proposed to us by Natasha Alechina.
Lemma 7 (Alechina) ` ¬HCϕ→ KC¬HCϕ.
Proof. By the Positive Strategic Introspection axiom,
` HCϕ → KCHCϕ. Thus, ` ¬KCHCϕ → ¬HCϕ by
the contrapositive. Hence, ` KC(¬KCHCϕ → ¬HCϕ)
by the Necessitation inference rule. Then, by the Dis-
tributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule
` KC¬KCHCϕ → KC¬HCϕ. Thus, by the Negative In-
trospection axiom and the laws of propositional reasoning,
` ¬KCHCϕ → KC¬HCϕ. Note that ¬HCϕ → ¬KCHCϕ
is the contrapositive of the Truth axiom. Therefore, by the
laws of propositional reasoning, ` ¬HCϕ→ KC¬HCϕ.
Lemma 8 ` HCϕ→ HDϕ, where C ⊆ D.
Proof. Note that ϕ → ϕ is a propositional tautology. Thus,
` ϕ → ϕ. Hence, ` HD\C(ϕ → ϕ) by the Strategic
Necessitation inference rule. At the same time, by the
Cooperation axiom, ` HD\C(ϕ → ϕ) → (HCϕ → HDϕ)
due to the assumption C ⊆ D. Therefore, ` HCϕ → HDϕ
by the Modus Ponens inference rule. 
Lemma 9 If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ψ, then
1. KCϕ1, . . . ,KCϕn ` KCψ,
2. HC1ϕ1, . . . ,HCnϕn ` H⋃ni=1 Ciψ, where setsC1, . . . , Cn
are pairwise disjoint.
Proof. To prove the second statement, apply deduction
lemma for propositional logic n time. Then, we have
` ϕ1 → (· · · → (ϕn → ψ)). Thus, by the Strategic Neces-
sitation inference rule, ` H∅(ϕ1 → (· · · → (ϕn → ψ)))
Hence, ` HC1ϕ1 → HC1(ϕ2 · · · → (ϕn → ψ)) by the
Cooperation axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule.
Then, HC1ϕ1 ` HC1(ϕ2 · · · → (ϕn → ψ)) by the Modus
Ponens inference rule. Thus, again by the Cooperation
axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule we have
HC1ϕ1 ` HC2ϕ2 → HC1∪C2(ϕ3 · · · → (ϕn → ψ)).
Therefore, by repeating the last two steps n − 2 times,
HC1ϕ1, . . . ,HCnϕn ` H⋃ni=1 Ciψ. The proof of the first
statement is similar, but it uses the Distributivity axiom
instead of the Cooperation axiom. 
Completeness
In the rest of this paper we focus on the completeness the-
orem for our logical system with respect to the class of
regular epistemic transition systems. We start the proof of
completeness by fixing a maximal consistent set of formu-
lae X0 and defining a canonical epistemic transition system
ETS(X0) = (W, {∼a}a∈A,Φ,M, pi) using the “unravel-
ling” technique (Sahlqvist 1975). Note that the domain of
choices in the canonical model is the set of all formulae Φ.
Canonical Epistemic Transition System
Definition 10 The set of epistemic states W consists of all
sequences X0, C1, X1, . . . , Cn, Xn, such that n ≥ 0 and
1. Xi is a maximal consistent subset of Φ for each i ≥ 1,
2. Ci ⊆ A for each i ≥ 1,
3. {ϕ | KCiϕ ∈ Xi−1} ⊆ Xi, for each i ≥ 1.
Definition 11 Suppose that w = X0, C1, X1, . . . , Cn, Xn
andw′ = X0, C ′1, X
′
1 . . . , C
′
m, X
′
m are epistemic states. For
any agent a ∈ A, let w ∼a w′ if there is a non-negative
integer k ≤ min{n,m} such that
1. Xi = X ′i for each i such that 0 < i ≤ k,
2. Ci = C ′i for each i such that 0 < i ≤ k,
3. a ∈ Ci for each i such that k < i ≤ n,
4. a ∈ C ′i for each i such that k < i ≤ m.
The next lemma states the basic property of the indistin-
guishability relation ∼a. The proof of this lemma is stan-
dard. See (Naumov and Tao 2017b) for details.
Lemma 10 For any epistemic states w,w′ ∈ W such that
w ∼C w′, if KCϕ ∈ hd(w), then ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Next, we specify the aggregation mechanism of the canoni-
cal epistemic transition system. Informally, if a coalition has
a know-how strategy to achieve ϕ and all members of the
coalition vote for ϕ, then ϕ must be true after the transition.
Definition 12 For any states w,w′ ∈ W and any complete
strategy profile s ∈ ΦA, let (w, s, w′) ∈M if
{ϕ | (HDϕ ∈ hd(w)) ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s)a = ϕ)} ⊆ hd(w′).
Definition 13 pi(p) = {w ∈W | p ∈ hd(w)}.
This concludes the definition of the canonical epistemic
transition system ETS(X0) = (W, {∼a}a∈A,Φ,M, pi).
We prove that this system is regular in Lemma 18.
K-child Lemmas The following technical results (Lem-
mas 11–15) about the knowledge modality K are used in the
proof of completeness.
Lemma 11 For any epistemic state w ∈ W if ¬KCϕ ∈
hd(w), then there is an epistemic state w′ ∈ W such that
w ∼C w′ and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Proof. Consider the set X = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | KCψ ∈ hd(w)}.
First, we show that set X is consistent. Assume the oppo-
site. Then, there exist formulae KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn ∈ hd(w)
such that ψ1, . . . , ψn ` ϕ. Thus, KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn ` KCϕ
by Lemma 9. Therefore, hd(w) ` KCϕ by the choice of for-
mulae KCψ1, . . . ,KCψn, which contradicts the consistency
of the set hd(w) due to the assumption ¬KCϕ ∈ hd(w).
Let Xˆ be a maximal consistent extension of set X
and let w′ be sequence w :: C :: X . Note that w′ ∈ W
by Definition 10 and the choice of set X . Furthermore,
w ∼C w′ by Definition 11. To finish the proof, note that
¬ϕ ∈ X ⊆ Xˆ = hd(w′) by the choice of set X . 
History h is a sequence whose last element hd(h) is an
epistemic state. Epistemic state hd(h), by Definition 10, is
also a sequence. Expression hd(hd(h)) denotes the last ele-
ment of the sequence hd(h).
Lemma 12 For any history h, if KCϕ ∈ hd(hd(h)), then
ϕ ∈ hd(hd(h′)) for each history h′ such that h ≈C h′.
Proof. Assumption h ≈C h′ by Definition 6 implies
that hd(h) ∼C hd(h′). Therefore, ϕ ∈ hd(hd(h′)) by
Lemma 10 and the assumption KCϕ ∈ hd(hd(h)). 
w1 w2s
w4 w3s'
C C
Figure 3: Illustration for Lemma 13.
Lemma 13 For any nonempty coalition C, any states
w1, w2, w3 ∈ W , and any complete strategy profile s such
that (w1, s, w2) ∈ M and w2 ∼C w3, see Figure 3, there
is a state w4 and a complete strategy profile s′ such that
w1 ∼C w4, (w4, s′, w3) ∈M , and s =C s′.
Proof. Let s′ be a complete strategy profile such that
(s′)a =
{
(s)a, if a ∈ C,
⊥, otherwise. (1)
Consider the set of formulae
X = {ϕ | KCϕ ∈ hd(w1)} ∪
{¬HDψ | ¬ψ ∈ hd(w3) ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)}.
First, we show that set X is consistent. Indeed, set
{¬HDψ | ¬ψ ∈ hd(w3) ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)}
is equal to the union of the following two sets
{¬HDψ | ¬ψ ∈ hd(w3) ∧D ⊆ C ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)},
{¬HDψ | ¬ψ ∈ hd(w3) ∧D * C ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)}.
The second set is a subset of {¬HD⊥ |D ⊆ A} by the
choice of strategy s′, see (1). Thus, set X is a subset of
{ϕ | KCϕ ∈ hd(w1)} ∪ {¬HD⊥ |D ⊆ A} ∪
{¬HDψ | ¬ψ ∈ hd(w3) ∧D ⊆ C ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)}.
Hence, by the Unachievability of Falsehood axiom, to show
the consistency of set X it suffices to prove the consistency
of the union of the set {ϕ | KCϕ ∈ hd(w1)} and the set
{¬HDψ | ¬ψ ∈ hd(w3) ∧D ⊆ C ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)}.
Suppose the opposite. In other words, assume that there are
formulae KCϕ1, . . . ,KCϕn ∈ hd(w1), (2)
formulae ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψm ∈ hd(w3), (3)
and sets D1, . . . , Dm ⊆ C, (4)
such that ∀i ≤ m ∀a ∈ Di ((s′)a = ψi), (5)
and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn,¬HD1ψ1, . . . ,¬HDmψm ` ⊥.
By Lemma 9 and the Truth axiom,
KCϕ1, . . . ,KCϕn,KC¬HD1ψ1, . . . ,KC¬HDmψm ` ⊥.
Hence, statement (2) and the consistency of the set hd(w1)
imply that there exists k ≤ m such that KC¬HDkψk /∈
hd(w1). Thus, ¬KC¬HDkψk ∈ hd(w1) due to the maxi-
mality of the set hd(w1). Then, ¬KDk¬HDkψk ∈ hd(w1)
by statement (4) and the contrapositive of the Monotonic-
ity axiom. Then, hd(w1) ` HDkψk by the contrapositive of
Lemma 7. Thus, hd(w1) ` HDkKCψk by the Perfect Re-
call axiom, statement (4), and the assumption of the lemma
that C 6= ∅. Hence, HDkKCψk ∈ hd(w1) due to the max-
imality of the set hd(w1). Note that statements (1) and (4)
imply s =Dk s
′. Then, (s)a = ψk for each agent a ∈ Dk
by statement (5). Thus, KCψk ∈ hd(w2) by assumption
(w1, s, w2) ∈ M , statement (4), and Definition 12. Hence,
ψk ∈ hd(w3) by the assumption w2 ∼C w3 of the lemma
and Lemma 10. This contradicts statement (3) and the con-
sistency of the set hd(w3). Therefore, set X is consistent.
Let Xˆ be any maximal consistent extension of set X . De-
fine w4 to be the sequence w1 :: C :: Xˆ . Note that w4 ∈ W
by Definition 10 and the choice of set X . At the same time,
w1 ∼C w4 by Definition 11 and Definition 3.
Finally, let us show that (w4, s′, w3) ∈ M using Defini-
tion 12. Consider any D ⊆ A and any HDψ ∈ hd(w4) = Xˆ
such that s′(a) = ψ for each a ∈ D. We need to show that
ψ ∈ hd(w3). Suppose the opposite. Then, ¬ψ ∈ hd(w3)
by the maximality of set hd(w3). Thus, ¬HDψ ∈ X by
the choice of set X . Hence, ¬HDψ ∈ X ⊆ Xˆ . Therefore,
HDψ /∈ Xˆ due to the consistency of set Xˆ , which contra-
dicts the choice of formula HDψ. 
Lemma 14 For any history h, if K∅ϕ /∈ hd(hd(h)), then
there is a history h′ s.t. h ≈∅ h′ and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(hd(h′)).
Proof. By Lemma 11, there is a state w ∈ W such that
hd(h) ∼C w and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(w). Let h′ be a one-element
sequence w. Note that h ≈∅ h′ by Definition 7. Finally,
¬ϕ ∈ hd(w) = hd(hd(h′)). 
Lemma 15 For any nonempty coalition C and any history
h, if KCϕ /∈ hd(hd(h)), then there is a history h′ such that
h ≈C h′ and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(hd(h′)).
Proof. Let h = (w0, s1, w1, . . . , sn, wn). We prove the
lemma by induction on integer n.
Base Case. Let n = 0. By Lemma 11, there is w′0 ∈W such
that w0 ∼C w′0 and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(w′0). Let h′ be a one-element
sequence w′0. Note that w0 ∼C w′0 implies that h ≈C h′ by
Definition 6. Also, ¬ϕ ∈ hd(w′0) = hd(hd(h′)).
w0 w1 wn-1 wns1 sn
hh_
w0 w1 wn-1 wns1 sn
hh_
'''' ' '
' '
C C C C
Figure 4: Histories h and h′.
Induction Step. Let h− = (w1, s2, . . . , sn, wn), see Fig-
ure 4. By Definition 5, sequence h− is a history. By the in-
duction hypothesis there is a history h′− such that h− ≈C
h′− and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(hd(h′−)). Let h′− = (w′1, s′2, . . . , s′n, w′n).
By Lemma 13, there is a state w′0 and a complete strategy
profile s′1 such that w0 ∼C w′0, (w′0, s′1, w′1) ∈ M , and
s1 =C s
′
1.
Define h′ = (w′0, s
′
1, w
′
1, s
′
2, . . . , s
′
n, w
′
n). By Defini-
tion 5, statement (w′0, s
′
1, w
′
1) ∈ M implies that h′ is a his-
tory. Note that h ≈C h′ by Definition 6 because h′− ≈C h−,
w0 ∼C w′0, and s1 =C s′1. Finally, ¬ϕ ∈ hd(hd(h′))
because hd(h′) = hd(h′−) and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(hd(h′−)). 
H-child Lemmas Lemmas 16 and 17 are about the know-
how modality H. They are used later in the proof.
Lemma 16 For any history h, if HCϕ ∈ hd(hd(h)), then
there is a strategy profile s of coalition C s.t. for any history
h′ :: s′ :: w′ if h ≈C h′ and s =C s′, then ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Proof. Consider a strategy profile s of coalition C such that
(s)a = ϕ for each agent a ∈ C. Suppose that HCϕ ∈
hd(hd(h)) and sequence h′ :: s′ :: w′ is a history such that
h ≈C h′ and s =C s′. It suffices to show that ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
By the Strategic Positive Introspection axiom, assumption
HCϕ ∈ hd(hd(h)) implies hd(hd(h)) ` KCHCϕ. Thus,
KCHCϕ ∈ hd(hd(h)) by the maximality of set hd(hd(h)).
Assumption h ≈C h′ implies hd(h) ∼C hd(h′) by Def-
inition 6. Thus, HCϕ ∈ hd(hd(h′)) by Lemma 10 and be-
cause KCHCϕ ∈ hd(hd(h)).
By Definition 5, assumption that sequence h′ :: s′ :: w′
is a history implies that (hd(h′), s′, w′) ∈ M . Thus,
ϕ ∈ hd(w′) by Definition 12 because HCϕ ∈ hd(hd(h′))
and (s′)a = (s)a = ϕ for each agent a ∈ C. 
Lemma 17 For any history h and any strategy profile s of a
coalition C, if ¬HCϕ ∈ hd(hd(h)), then there is a history
h :: s′ :: w′ such that s =C s′ and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(w′).
Proof. Let w = hd(h). Consider a complete strategy profile
s′ and a set of formulae X such that
(s′)a =
{
(s)a, if a ∈ C,
>, otherwise, (6)
and X = {¬ϕ} ∪ {χ | K∅χ ∈ hd(w)} ∪
{ψ | HDψ ∈ hd(w) ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)}.
First, we show that set X is consistent. Indeed, note that set
{ψ | HDψ ∈ hd(w) ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)} is equal to the
union of the following two sets
{ψ | HDψ ∈ hd(w) ∧D ⊆ C ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)},
{ψ | HDψ ∈ hd(w) ∧D * C ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)}.
The second of the two sets is a subset of {>} by the choice
(6) of strategy profile s′. Thus, set X is a subset of
{>} ∪ {¬ϕ} ∪ {χ | K∅χ ∈ hd(w)} ∪
{ψ | HDψ ∈ hd(w) ∧D ⊆ C ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)}.
Hence, to show the consistency of set X , it suffices to prove
the consistency of the union of {¬ϕ}∪{χ | K∅χ ∈ hd(w)}
and {ψ | HDψ ∈ hd(w) ∧D ⊆ C ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)}.
Suppose the opposite. In other words, assume there are
formulae K∅χ1, . . . ,K∅χn ∈ hd(w) (7)
and formulae HD1ψ1, . . . ,HDmψm ∈ hd(w) (8)
such that D1, . . . , Dm ⊆ C, (9)
∀i ≤ m ∀a ∈ Di ((s′)a = ψi), (10)
and χ1, . . . , χn, ψ1, . . . , ψm ` ϕ. By Lemma 9,
H∅χ1, . . . ,H∅χn,HD1ψ1, . . . ,HDmψm ` H∪mi=1Diϕ.
Then, by the Empty Coalition axiom,
K∅χ1, . . . ,K∅χn,HD1ψ1, . . . ,HDmψm ` H∪mi=1Diϕ.
Thus, by Lemma 8 and assumption (9),
K∅χ1, . . . ,K∅χn,HD1ψ1, . . . ,HDmψm ` HCϕ.
Hence, hd(w) ` HCϕ by assumption (7) and assump-
tion (8). Then, ¬HCϕ /∈ hd(w) due to the consistency of
the set hd(w), which contradicts the assumption ¬HCϕ ∈
hd(w) of the lemma. Therefore, set X is consistent.
Let set Xˆ be a maximal consistent extension of set X and
w′ be the sequence w :: ∅ :: Xˆ . Note that w′ ∈ W by
Definition 10 and because {χ | K∅χ ∈ hd(w)} ⊆ X ⊆
Xˆ = hd(w′) by the choice of set X .
Also note that (w, s′, w′) ∈ M by Definition 12 and be-
cause {ψ | HDψ ∈ hd(w) ∧ ∀a ∈ D((s′)a = ψ)} ⊆ X ⊆
Xˆ = hd(w′) by the choice of set X . Thus, h :: s′ :: w′ is a
history by Definition 5.
Finally, ¬ϕ ∈ hd(w′) because ¬ϕ ∈ X ⊆ Xˆ = hd(w′)
by the choice of set X . 
Lemma 18 The system ETS(X0) is regular.
Proof. Let w ∈ W and s ∈ V A. By Definition 2, it
suffices to show that there is an epistemic state w′ such that
(w, s, w′) ∈ M . Indeed, let history h be a single-element
sequence w. Note that ¬HA⊥ ∈ hd(w) = hd(hd(h)) by
the Unachievability of Falsehood axiom and due to the max-
imality of set hd(w). Thus, by Lemma 17, there is a history
h :: s′ :: w′ such that s =A s′. Hence, (hd(h), s′, w′) ∈ M
by Definition 5. At the same time, s =A s′ implies that
s = s′ by Definition 4. Thus, (hd(h), s, w′) ∈ M . There-
fore, (w, s, w′) ∈M because hd(h) = w. 
Completeness: Final Steps
Lemma 19 h  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ hd(hd(h)) for each history h and
each formula ϕ ∈ Φ.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on the structural
complexity of formula ϕ. If ϕ is an atomic proposition p,
then h  p iff hd(h) ∈ pi(p), by Definition 9. Hence, h  p
iff p ∈ hd(hd(h)) by Definition 13.
The cases when formula ϕ is a negation or an implication
follow from Definition 9 and the maximality and the consis-
tency of the set hd(hd(h)) in the standard way.
Next, suppose that formula ϕ has the form KCψ.
(⇒) : Let KCψ /∈ hd(hd(h)). Then, either by Lemma 14
(when set C is empty) or by Lemma 15 (when set C is
nonempty), there is a history h′ such that h ≈C h′ and
¬ψ ∈ hd(hd(h′)). Hence, h′ 1 ψ by the induction hypoth-
esis. Therefore, h 1 KCψ by Definition 9.
(⇐) : Let h 1 KCψ. By Definition 9, there is a history
h′ such that h ≈C h′ and h′ 1 ψ. Thus, ψ /∈ hd(hd(h′))
by the induction hypothesis. Then, KCϕ /∈ hd(hd(h)) by
Lemma 12.
Finally, let formula ϕ be of the form HCψ.
(⇒) : Assume h  HCψ. Then, by Definition 9, there is a
strategy profile s ∈ ΦC such that for any history h′ :: s′ ::
w′, if h ≈C h′ and s =C s′, then h′ :: s′ :: w′  ψ. Thus,
by Lemma 3,
for any history h :: s′ :: w′, if s =C s′, then
h :: s′ :: w′  ψ. (11)
Suppose that HCψ /∈ hd(hd(h)). Then, ¬HCψ ∈
hd(hd(h)) due to the maximality of the set hd(hd(h)).
Hence, by Lemma 17, there is a history h :: s′ :: w′ such
that s =C s′ and ¬ψ ∈ hd(w′). Thus, ψ /∈ hd(w′) due to
the consistency of set hd(w′). Hence, by the induction hy-
pothesis, h :: s′ :: w′ 1 ψ, which contradicts statement (11).
(⇐) : Assume that HCψ ∈ hd(hd(h)). By Lemma 16,
there is a strategy profile s ∈ ΦC such that for any history
h′ :: s′ :: w′ if h ≈C h′ and s =C s′, then ψ ∈ hd(w′).
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for any history
h′ :: s′ :: w′ if h ≈C h′ and s =C s′, then h′ :: s′ :: w′  ψ.
Therefore, h  HCψ by Definition 9. 
Theorem 2 If h  ϕ for each history h of each regular
epistemic transition system, then ` ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that 0 ϕ. Consider any maximal consistent
set X0 such that ¬ϕ ∈ X0. Let h0 be a single-element se-
quence consisting of just set X0. By Definition 5, sequence
h0 is a history of the canonical epistemic transition sys-
tem ETS(X0). Then, h0  ¬ϕ by Lemma 19. Therefore,
h0 1 ϕ by Definition 9. 
Theorem 2 can be generalized to the strong completeness
theorem in the standard way. We also believe that the num-
ber of states and the domain of choices in the canonical
model can be made finite using filtration on subformulae.
Conclusion
We have extended the recent study of the interplay be-
tween knowledge and strategic coalition power (A˚gotnes
and Alechina 2016; Fervari et al. 2017; Naumov and Tao
2017c; 2017a) to the case of perfect recall. Our main results
are the soundness and the completeness theorems.
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